Electronically Filed

8/30/2019 12:28 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Karel Lehrman, Clerk ofthe Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

IN

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

JEFRI DAVIS and DEBBIE DAVIS,
Supreme Court N0: 46721-2019
Plalntlffs/Appeuams’

Bonner County No. CV—09—18—0672

VS.

DONALD MCCANLIES, CHARLES TUMA,
and

JOHNSON HOUSE COMPANY,
Defendants/Respondents.

Appeal from the

Of the

District

Court of the First Judicial District

State 0f Idaho, in

and for the County 0f Bonner

Honorable Barbara A. Buchanan, Presiding

APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF

M. Bistline
BISTLINE LAW, PLLC
Arthur

1205 N.

3rd Street

Daniel Toby McLaughlin

Attorney

312

at

S. First

Law
Avenue,

Ste.

Coeur d’Alene, ID 83814

Sandpoint, ID 83864

Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant

Attorney for Respondent

A

1.

The Davises

relied

upon Tuma’s misrepresentation 0f the access

t0 their

home. This

whether 0r not the Davises failed
due diligence When thev did not open the e-mail with the survev more
than two months after theV had purchased their home.
fact alone creates a material question 0f fact as to

to exercise

Tuma argues

that nothing in the record could lead a reasonable jury t0 conclude that the

Davises exercised due diligence in

this case.

Tuma’s misrepresentations regarding

It is

undisputed that the Davises relied upon

the access t0 their

home and when that

occurs,

it is

for the

jury to determine if the Davises failed t0 exercise due diligence.

Hall

v.

Forsloﬁ’, 124 Idaho 771,

864 P.2d 609 (1993) involved a question 0f the exercise

0f due diligence. In that case, Hall had purchased a business from Forsloff and then ﬁled

suit for

breach 0f contract. Hall 10st that case and entered into a Novation Agreement t0 pay certain
debts that Forsloff had guaranteed

When he owned the company

in question. Hall then sued

Forsloff again alleging that the Forsloff had misrepresented the ﬁnancial condition 0f the

company and that Hall could not have discovered
was entered

in the ﬁrst case.

this misrepresentation until after the

On summary judgment,

judgment

the Trial Court concluded Hall could have

discovered the misrepresentation because Hall had been running the business for 10 months and
the “...Novation Agreement, t0

which

documents describing the ﬁnancial
statements” Id at 610-61

Given

1,

the plaintiff was a party, expressly incorporated

status

of the business, including balance sheets and income

772-773. The Supreme Court reversed.

Hall's access to these

documents, the Trial Court determined

which would
and outstanding obligations of the business
were different from the representations contained in the documents
incorporated in the novation.” However, the Trial Court did not
have the advantage of our Kawai Farms opinion at the time of its
decision. In Kawai Farms, relying 0n our prior decision in
Gerlach v. Schultz, 72 Idaho 507, 244 P.2d 1095 (1952), we held
that an individual's reliance 0n another's fraudulent representations
can affect the question as t0 Whether a proper investigation was
conducted, and therefore can raise more than one conclusion as t0
that Hall

show

had

failed t0 “allege facts in the record

that the status

2

whether the fraud could have been discovered through reasonable

We hold that to be the situation here.

diligence.

Hall

Forsloﬂ, 124 Idaho 771, 774—75, 864 P.2d

v.

609, 612—13 (1993).
In Hall, the person claiming that he

had exercised due diligence had been running the

business for ten months and had total access t0

all

the ﬁnancial records.

someone running a business should have a pretty good idea of what
Nevertheless, the fact that he alleged he relied

upon

is

You would think that

in the ﬁnancial records.

Forsloffs misrepresentations

get the issue 0f Whether Hall exercised due diligence in front 0f a jury. Here,

with lay persons
estate agent.

who were

(R. V01.

1,

P 202,

1]

That reliance

20).

nothing in

it

t0

being sent the survey in an e-mail.

that

would lead any person

mail only says “Let
Lastly,

it is

to

me know if you need

is

all

undisputed that the DaVises used Gray

months prior

t0

are dealing

inexperienced in real estate and were relying entirely on their real

Whether 0r not they exercised due diligence, as d0
It is

we

was enough

enough

t0 create a question

of fact as to

the other facts in the record.

Wolf Road t0
It is

access their

home

for the

two

also undisputed that the e-mail itself has

conclude that anything was amiss. The body of the e-

anything

else.

Thank you—“

(R. V01.

1, p.

112).

a question 0f fact as t0 Whether the DaVises should have caught the problem even if

they had opened the attached survey.

The Davises have argued and

readily admit that the survey plainly

easement for Gray Wolf Road does not reach the Davis property —
perhaps a

title

examiner 0r an attorney

would have ﬁgured

who practices

that out is a question

lay person could ﬁgure that out, the jury could

think there

was a problem

still

if you are

real estate law.

of fact for the jury. Even

it

a surveyor, a

if the

jury concluded that a

conclude that the Davises had n0 reason t0

0r even suggested they could not.

3

that the

Whether a lay person

since the road clearly provided access to their

prevented them from using

shows

home and no one had

This case involves a jury

(R.

trial.

misrepresentation 0f the access t0 their

V01

2.

The

District

upon Tuma’s
other facts of this

granted.

Court did not rule 0n anvthing other than When the statute 0f
in this case and there is nothing else for this Court t0 review.

commenced

Tuma argues

that this

Court can uphold the District Court on the alternative grounds that

the Davises did provide evidence that

Tuma is

relied

Whether or not the DaVises failed t0 exercise due

summary judgment should not have been

limitations

The DaVises

home and given that reliance, and the

case, a material question 0f fact existed as to

diligence and

p. 17).

1,

Tuma knew he was mispresenting the

access t0 their home.

asking this court to pass 0n a question of fact that the District Court did not even

consider, and

it is

not proper. This Court can reach the same conclusion 0n an issue as a Trial

Court, but for different reasons, but cannot review decisions that the Trial Court never made.

Tuma Cites Nampa & Meridian Irr.
for the proposition that this Court can

Dist.

v.

Mussel], 139 Idaho 28, 72 P.3d 868, (2003)

uphold the District Court 0n the alternative grounds that

Tuma did not have the necessary intent

for a fraud case.

Nampa involved an irrigation district

suing one of its customers for damaging a canal. The District Court concluded that Idaho

55-3 10 allowed the District to recover damages.

0n the

I.C. §

On appeal,

the

Supreme Court declined

Code

to rule

55-3 10 issue because the District Court had found that the Defendant had damaged

the canal and that

was

interference With an easement

The Supreme Court reached

the

same conclusion on

Which allowed

for

an award of damages.

the issue of the availability of damages, but

for a different reason.

For example,

Tum from this

suit.

Tuma seems t0

concede that Idaho Code

Assuming, arguenda,

Court could conclude that

it

was an

it

§

55-811 cannot be used to shield

could, the District Court

error to grant

had ruled

it

summary judgment on the due

could not, this

diligence issue,

§

but could uphold the District Court by ruling that the Davises had constructive knowledge based

0n Idaho Code

§

The only
constructive

55-81

1.

issue the District Court ruled

knowledge and

this

0n

in this case

was When

Court should not consider any other

the DaVises

had actual 0r

issue.

We note that although Wells Fargo raised the issue 0f standing
during the

trial

district court.

was never ruled on by the
0n appeal, the record must contain

court proceedings

“T0

raise

an issue

it

an adverse ruling t0 form the basis for assignment 0f error....” State
v.

Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 687 99 P.3d 1069, 1077 (2004) (citation

Houpt

Wells Fargo Bank,
Nat. Ass’n, 160 Idaho 181, 186, 370 P.3d 384, 389 (2016), reh’g
omitted) (quotation marks omitted).

v.

denied (Mar. 10, 2016).
3.

Tuma may have made an

honest mistake about the access, but he was most certainly
aware that he was neither a lawyer, surveyor 0r title examiner and had n0 business
making representations about anything in the recorded documents pertaining t0
this property.

Tuma argues

that his honest mistake shields

him from a claim of misrepresentation. An

honest mistake does not shield a person from a claim for fraud. Furthermore,

made an honest mistake,

but he certainly

knew he was

not qualiﬁed to review

Tuma may have
title

documents

and make representations about the contents 0f those documents.

As

stated above, the Court should not consider the issue 0f Tuma’s intent in

making

the

misrepresentation because the District Court did not rule 0n that issue. But if the Court does

consider the issue, an honest mistake does not shield a person from liability for misrepresentation

for fraud.

made through mistake 0f the facts
as they actually exist, When such misrepresentation is made by one
Whose duty it is to know the facts and Who represents himself as
Although a misrepresentation

possessing

all

the facts With reference t0 the matter, the

law equally as fraudulent and actionable as
had been knowingly made.

misrepresentation
if

it

is

is

in

Doe v. Boy Scouts 0fAm.,

159 Idaho

103, 107, 356 P.3d 1049, 1053

5

Idaho Title
Trust C0. 22 Idaho 440, 126 P.2d

(2015) citing Hillock

&

6 12

Furthermore,

it

would appear that

honest mistake shield’s him from

It

(1

v.

9 12)(emphasis supplied).

the “due diligence” rule plays a role in whether

Tuma’s

liability.

seldom happen, however, that a case is rested upon the mere
0f falsity in the statement; usually the circumstances under

Will

fact

Which

it

was made,

the opportunity 0f the person

know the truth, and other facts
from the evidence, as

is

making

it

to

bearing upon the scienter, appear

the case in

most 0f the decisions

cited

by

appellants.

Boise Ass'n ofCrediz‘ Men

v.

U.S. Fire Ins. C0.,

44

Idaho 249, 256 P. 523, 528 (1927) (emphasis
supplied).

Here,

Tuma knew he was not a lawyer,

exercise of due diligence, if he

was going

a surveyor or a

t0 advise the

title

examiner. In the proper

Davises 0n the access t0 their home, he

should have taken the information t0 a professional trained t0 examine surveys and

documents.

Had he done

so,

he would have known that his representation about the access t0 the

home was wrong and none of this would have
Tuma’s

intent

is

title

occurred.

not before the Court, but he represented t0 the DaVises that he had

reviewed the documents and that Gray Wolf Road was the access to their home. Whether or not
he intentionally tried t0 deceive the DaVises

is

not relevant t0 a claim for misrepresentation.

This action never would have been instituted

4.

Brokerage Representation Agreement, s0
Agreement.

Tuma argues

that the

fails

the Davises’ had not signed the

this dispute clearlv arises out 0f that

Davises are not entitled to an award 0f attorney’s fees on appeal

because the Davises did not sue
This argument

if

Tuma

for breach

because the DaVises did sue

0f the Brokerage Representation Agreement.

Tuma for breach

0f the Agreement and

this

dispute could not have existed but for the existence of the Brokerage Representation Agreement.

Tuma argues

that the

Davises did not sue

Tuma

for breach

0f the Brokerage

Representation Agreement. The Davises’ complaint alleges that they entered into a Brokerage
Representation Agreement With Tuma. (R. V01.

Code

§

1,

p

54-2087 which speciﬁes the duties owed t0 a

alleges that

Tuma failed t0

14, ﬂ81.)

client.

The complaint

(Id at 1184).

carry out those duties and the duties imposed

Representation Agreement. (Id

at 1188).

The Davises did

also cites Idaho

The complaint then

by

the Brokerage

allege a breach 0f the Brokerage

Representation Agreement, the District Court just failed t0

make any

ruling

0n

that allegation

because the heading “breach 0f Brokerage Representation Agreement” was not in the complaint.
Furthermore, the Davises would not have needed t0 plead or prove that the Brokerage
Representation Agreement was breached t0 be entitled t0 attorney’s fees. “It

consequence that the underlying contractual obligation

is

unenforceable.

is

0f n0

A prevailing party may

recover attorney fees even though n0 liability under a contract was established 0r Where no
contract was, in fact, ever formed.’ “Allied Bail Bonds, Inc.

414, 258 P.3d 340, 349 (201
(quoting Hilbert

v.

1) citing

Cly.

Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho

ofKootenai, 151 Idaho 405,
at

439, 80 P.3d at 1040

Hough, 132 Idaho 203, 207, 969 P.2d 836, 840 (Ct.App.1998)).

N0 argument exists that this
Agreement.

v.

case did not arise out of the Brokerage Representation

Tuma would not have been

engaging in any of the conduct for Which he was sued

if

the Davises

had not signed

that agreement. This dispute arises out

of the Brokerage

Representation Agreement and the Davises are entitled t0 their attorney’s fees 0n appeal.

The Davises’ argument

5.

the Motion t0

Tuma argues
discretion decision

not

fatal,

Amend the Complaint is

that the

by

that the District Court abused

Tuma

the Trial Court.

when

contents of the proposed

discretion

when

it

denied

supported bV argument.

Davises failed to lay out the standard 0f review for an abuse of

providing some argument

Davises did just that

its

is

made

they argued that

also points out that failing t0 lay out the standard

is

explaining What the Trial Court did wrong. The

it

was an abuse of discretion

t0 not consider the

Amended Complaint when ruling on whether the amendment would be

futile.

amendment

In their opening brief, the Davises’ argue that a decision to allow an

reviewed for an abuse of discretion and that

it is

not an abuse of discretion t0 deny a Motion t0

Amend if the proposed new claims

are time barred.

Court abused

it

its

discretion because

is

The Davises then argue

that the District

did not consider the claim in the proposed

Amended

Complaint.

The Davises may have

failed t0 lay out the total abuse

argue that the District Court abused

its

discretion because

it

of discretion standard, but they did

denied the Motion t0

grounds that the claims in the original Complaint were time barred. This

argument
6.

that

more than adequately explains

the error the Trial Court

is

Amend on the

a well taken

made and why.

Anv

ruling bv the District Court that the Motion for Relief from the Pre—Trial
Order was denied was dicta as the District Court considered the Motion t0 Amend
0n the merits and then ruled.

Tuma argues

that the

Davises were required t0 appeal the denial 0f the Motion for Relief

from the Pre-Trial Order. This

is

incorrect because the District Court denied the

Relief based solely 0n the denial 0f the Motion t0

Amend

s0 that issue

is

Motion

subsumed

for

in the appeal

of the denial of the Motion t0 Amend. Furthermore, the District Court granted the Motion for
Relief When

Motion

it

considered the Motion t0

Amend on the merits,

therefore,

any ruling on the

for Relief was dicta.

As Tuma points

out, the standard

Pre-Trial Order and a denial 0f a

considerations are different.

and only denied
related t0

it

The

Motion
District

0f review for a denial 0f a Motion for Relief from the
t0

Amend are

different as the Trial Court’s

Court made no ﬁndings related to the Motion for Relief

because of the prior ruling on the Motion t0

“good cause” as

is

Amend — not for any reason

required t0 rule 0n a Motion for Relief from the Pre-Trial Order.

Since the denial 0f the Motion for Relief was on the sole grounds that the Motion to

Complaint was denied, the issue 0f the Motion for Relief is subsumed
0f the Motion t0

Amend and

in the appeal

and she effectively granted the motion by considering the Motion

merits.

related to the

Motion

t0

this

Court t0 review

Amend 0n the merits.

Court had denied the Motion for Relief from the Pre-Trial Order because

no showing 0f good cause had been shown, there was no need

on the

0f the denial

should be considered 0n appeal. I.A.R. § 35(a)(4). The District

Court made no ruling on the Motion for Relief from the Pre-Trial Order for

If the District

Amend the

t0 evaluate the

Motion

to

Amend

By ruling on the Motion t0 Amend on the merits, and failing to make any ﬁndings
Motion

for Relief from the Pretrial Order, the District Court effectively granted the

for Relief from the Pre-Trial

was unnecessary

Order and any ruling related

t0 the determination

While the

t0 that

motion was dicta as

of the case.

parties apparently did discuss this issue in

arguments

was not raised by the pleadings
summary judgment motion, and accordingly the District
Court's summary judgment discussing that issue was dicta and
unnecessary t0 decide the issues Which were raised by the
pleadings and by the motion for summary judgment.
before the District Court, that issue
0r the

Jerome CZy. By & Through Bd. 0f
Comm'rsfor Jerome Cly., State 0f
9

it

Idaho v. Holloway, 118 Idaho 681,
685, 799 P.2d 969, 973 (1990).

The Davis’s were not required
Pre-Trial Order.

The

District

considering the Motion to

to appeal the denial

of their Motion for Relief from the

Court did not evaluate that motion effectively and granted

Amend on the merits

so any denial 0f that motion

was

dicta

it

by

and did

not need to be appealed.
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